We analyze whether merger policy will be used to create global players, i.e.
Introduction
In political circles the argument is sometimes put forth that mergers of domestic firms have the advantage of creating 'global players', i.e. bigger firms that will be in a better position to compete with foreign firms in world markets. A recent example in Germany has been the merger between the E. ON Following the contribution by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and its extension to an open economy setting in Barros and Cabrol (1994) , there has recently been an upsurge of interest in merger control in both closed and open economies (Falvey, 1998; Horn and Levinsohn, 2001; Lagerlof and Heidhues, 2003; Lommerud and Sørgaard, 1997; Röller, 2000a, 2000b; Richardson, 1999; Sleuwaegen, 1998) . Moreover, there have been some recent empirical contributions (Duso, Neven and Röller, 2003; Sørgaard, 1997) . A detailed literature review is to be added here.
However, following the tradition introduced in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and adapted by Barros and Cabrol (1994) , many of the recent models in this area have relied on the concept of a 'marginal merger' that can be analyzed by means of traditional infinitesimal changes in output. In contrast, the present paper sets up a simple, linear model of Cournot competition in open economies that allows to make comparisons over discrete merger equilibria. Underlying our analysis is the basic trade-off between the anti-competitive effects of a merger and a reduction in production costs caused by positive synergy effects (Williamson, 1968) .
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The simplicity of our framework allows 1 The importance of the 'global player' argument in the context of the E.ON-Ruhrgas merger was also stressed in a detailed report of the ifo Research Institute, commissioned by the E.ON corporation (see Sinn, 2002, pp. 10-12.) 2 For a detailed, recent summary of the possible efficiency gains from mergers, see Röller, Stennek and Verboven (2000) .
us to focus on the critical cost reduction needed for a merger to be in the interest of the firms involved, the home country, and the world as a whole. By comparing these conditions, we find that national merger policies will generally be 'too restrictive' from a perspective of world surplus maximization, whereas merger policies in a union of countries will be 'too permissive' towards merger proposals. Hence, our results confirm the 'global player' argument for merger policies at the regional, but not at the national level.
Our simple framework also permits an analysis of international merger, where again the attractiveness of a merger from a firm, a national and a world perspective can be examined. Furthermore, the attitude of merger authorities towards domestic and international mergers can be compared.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework of our analysis.
Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which mergers are in the interest of firms and characterizes the resulting Nash equilibria. Section 4 turns to optimal merger policy from the perspectives of a single country, a union of countries, and the (model) world as a whole. Section 5 provides a brief analysis of international merger (between a home and a foreign firm) and its effects on firms, consumers and countries. Section 6 concludes.
The model
In this section we set up a simple model which allows us to analyze some of the dimensions associated with merger policy and the creation of global players.
The focus is on an open economy, called the home country H, where the market for a certain good is served by two domestic producers. The same two firms also export to a market abroad (referred to as the world market, and sometimes indexed W). In the domestic market the two firms do not face any competition, whereas on the market abroad they compete with two firms from another country, called the foreign country, F. These two foreign firms in addition supply the good to their respective domestic market, where again they are the only suppliers. The model framework is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The two domestic firms consider merging, and we shall also study the consequences cons.
cons.
of merger plans on the part of the two foreign companies. As far as possible we rely on symmetry in setting up the model. Prior to any merger, all firms have the same (constant) level of marginal cost; all markets are characterized by Cournot competition; and the size of the two 'national' markets (in the home and foreign countries, respectively) are equal. The market abroad (the world market) may be bigger than any of the local markets.
A few remarks on the model are in order. In deciding on the model, our criteria have been that we wish to study merger policy in an open economy; in particular we wish to shed some light on the creation of 'global players', i.e. firms which besides being large in the national market are also important players in the world market. So a merger in the model should have international consequences. At the same time, a merged company should still be facing competition from other firms; these we have placed in the foreign country. For symmetry reasons, also the competitors regard the world market as a market abroad, while at the same time serving their respective own market. 3 As an alternative, we could have set up a two-country model, in which firms in both countries
In line with much of the literature on merger policy (see the Introduction) we take imperfect competition to be of the Cournot-Nash type in all markets and the good under consideration to be homogeneous. Moreover, markets are segmented and firms maximize profits in each market separately.
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The domestic market is given by the inverted demand schedule
The price in the domestic market is labeled p, and the linear demand schedule is characterized by the intercept a and the slope parameter b. The intercept a measures the maximum price consumers are willing to pay for the first unit of the good, while the size of the market is determined primarily by the slope parameter b. The two home country firms supply x 1 and x 2 , respectively, prior to merger, and they do so facing a marginal cost of unity.
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There are no fixed costs, and the number of domestic firms (two) is held fixed, except for the possibility of a merger of the two.
Quite conventionally, the maximization of profits in the two duopoly firms results in quantities supplied of Consumer surplus cs and joint producer surplus of the two firms, ps, each amounts to
serve each other's market. In that model, a symmetric set-up of the two countries would have been natural. However, that set-up would not correspond well with the image related to creation of global players in a world market. Hence, we opted for the three-market framework above. 5 The demand schedule can be derived in a general equilibrium framework from a quadratic and quasi-linear utility function.
6 Naturally, we therefore assume that a > 1.
Hence, total surplus in the domestic market, ts, which is the sum of consumer and producer surpluses is twice the amount in the formula,
The two home firms both service the market abroad and do so together with the two firms in the foreign country. There, the inverted demand curve is
Upper-case letters generally refer to the world market (and lower-case letters to the domestic market). Hence, X 1 , X 2 are the supplies of the two home firms, while Y 1 , Y 2 denote supplies of the two foreign firms. The slope parameter B will in general be different from the slope parameter b for the market in the home country. A world market which is bigger than the national market is represented by a B which lies below
Maximizing profits, all four firms supply the quantity
yielding a price of
lying (a − 1)/5 above unitary marginal cost.
The two domestic firms together harvest a producer surplus of
from the world market. World consumers, on the other hand, register a consumer surplus of
as a result of the less than perfect competition in the world market.
Finally, the domestic market in the foreign country, assumed to be served exclusively by the two foreign firms, is a complete mirror image of the parallel market in the home country, so there is no need to go into details.
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In this section we consider the incentives for the two domestic firms to merge and become one firm in the domestic market as well as in the world market. We thus seek to identify the situations in which the sum of producer surpluses on the part of the two firms from both the domestic and world markets stands to increase following a merger.
If the two firms merge we postulate, in line with the discussion of several of the motives for mergers in practice (see the Introduction), that the merged firm realizes a reduction of marginal cost of ∆ ≥ 0, so that it falls to 1 − ∆. As a special case, there may be no cost reduction at all, ∆ = 0, but we shall generally allow for a lowering of marginal cost (and conversely ignore any possibility of a cost increase). On many occasions below, the size of the cost reduction will determine whether a merger will be in the interest of the firms involved or other parties affected by the merger.
A merger of the two domestic firms results in a monopoly in the domestic market. In consequence, profit maximization will result in a quantity of
and a market price of
i.e. [(a − 1) + ∆]/2 above the new marginal cost of (1 − ∆). The superscript 'M' stands for merger of home firms, where needed.
On account of monopoly, consumer surplus in the domestic market has been altered to
while producer surplus is twice this, or
Compared with the previous duopoly situation, as long as the cost reduction is nonnegative, the move to monopoly will increase producer surplus. Consumer surplus, on the contrary, will go down, unless any cost reduction is rather sizeable. We demonstrate in section 4 that the cost reduction has to be at least ∆ = (a − 1)/3 to avoid a fall in domestic consumer surplus upon the merger.
We next turn to the consequence of the domestic merger for the world market. For later use we distinguish between two cases: In the first, no merger has taken place between the foreign firms; in the second, there already has been a merger between the two foreign firms.
Case 1: No foreign merger
At the same time as the merged firm becomes a monopoly in the national market, it will be one of three suppliers on the market abroad. Maximizing profits, it decides to
to the world market, while the foreign competitors sell
The price resulting from these quantities is
resulting in producer surplus on the part of the home merged firm of
This compares with joint producer surplus of the two foreign firms of
where a subscript 'F' is here used to distinguish foreign firms.
Will the merged firm experience a higher producer surplus on the world market? Likely not. It has become one out of three firms in the market instead of two out of four, so to say, and without cost reduction this implies a fall in the market share of one sixth.
Even though a higher price ensues with only three suppliers, this will not be enough to outweigh the reduced market share. A sizeable cost reduction is the only way to avoid a fall in the producer surplus on the part of the merged home firm. The precise condition for the expression in (9) to dominate that in (5) 
Fortunately for the merged firm, gains in the home market can be set against the possibly negative effect on producer surplus in the world market. Adding producer surpluses in the two markets, the sum becomes
post-merger, compared to pre-merger producer surpluses of
A merger will only be in the two home firms' interest, if the former sum exceeds the latter sum. The criterion for this can be written
The formula comprises the gains and losses from merging. First, there is a gain from greater monopoly power and concentration in the domestic market (the first part of the first term). Second, there is the loss of market share in the world market (the second part of the first term). Third, whatever cost reduction may ensue from the merger obviously benefits the merged firm in both markets (the second and third terms).
Without any drop in marginal cost, only the former two effects matter. It is easily seen that the condition for a merger to be sensible then is
In other words, and quite intuitively, the world market should not be much larger than the domestic market, if the net gain from the merger absent cost reduction is to be positive.
A natural benchmark for the size of the world market, given the presence of four firms there initially against only two in each national market, might be that it is twice as large as any national market in the sense that B = b/2. In our model, this relative size of the world market is not compatible with a net gain from merging in the case, where the merger does not result in any lowering of marginal cost.
Incorporating the possibility of a reduction of marginal cost in the merged firm, the condition on the size of cost reduction for the two home firms to willingly merge is
where for simplicity we use R ≡ B/b. As expected, the criterion hinges on the relative sizes of the world and home markets, cf. the presence of R = B/b in the condition. It is easily checked that a world market twice the size of the home market, i.e. B/b = 0.5, implies that there has to be a cost reduction for there to be incentives for merger. This is quite in line with the condition in (12) above. Also, the larger the relative size of the world market, i.e. the lower is R, the stricter is the criterion on ∆ in the sense of raising∆. Finally, setting R = 0 in (13) yields∆
a fact we shall use below.
As will be clear already now, the assumptions of Cournot competition in all markets and a homogeneous good are not very 'friendly' towards merger.
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A drawback of the merger is the likely loss of position and market share in the world market.
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The flip side of this could well be that the foreign firms, following the reduction in the number of firms in the world market from four to three, benefit. In section 4 we demonstrate that the change in their combined producer surplus will be positive, as long as ∆ < (a − 1)/5. This is the same condition as the condition for the price in the world market to rise following the merger. When the condition is fulfilled, a modest cost reduction will be outweighed by increased market concentration when it comes to determination of the world market price.
Facing one merged company in lieu of two competitors in the world market will accordingly be beneficial to the two foreign firms, as long as any cost reduction on the part of the merged company is small. On the other hand, should the merged company experience a huge fall in marginal cost, it will be able to effect a lower price in the world market, to the disadvantage of the two foreign firms.
We sum up our findings in 8 Similar observations are made in Salant et al. (1983) .
9 An alternative assumption of, say, Bertrand competition with homogeneous good would imply that the merged firm will be able to completely drive out its competitors in the world market, if it has experienced a cost reduction.
Case 2: Foreign firms have merged
For future use we quickly go through the same steps as above on the assumption that the two foreign competitors have already merged. On account of symmetry in the model we then know that the cost reduction enabled by a merger and thus enjoyed by the foreign companies must fulfill the requirement in (13) above. Given this, will the domestic firms have an incentive to merge, too?
If they merge, the home market moves from duopoly to monopoly, just as above. In the world market, rather than having two home firms and a merged foreign firm, a duopoly between a merged foreign firm and a merged home firm ensues. Maximizing profits, they sell
at a price of
which is (a − 1 + ∆) above the new marginal cost of 1 − ∆ of both merged firms. (We denote by 'MM' the situation of double merger.) From this, the home merged firm realizes a producer surplus of
The two home firms will have an incentive to merge, provided the sum of producer surpluses in (8) and (14) dominate the sum of producer surpluses in (2) and (10). Is this the case for cost reductions greater than∆ in (13)? An easy way to establish an affirmative answer is to observe first, that the sum of producer surpluses (8) and (14) increases in ∆; and second, that the differences between producer surpluses in (14) and (9) is positive, as long as ∆ < (a − 1)/5. Together, these two observations yield that the value of ∆, at which it starts to be attractive for the two home firms to merge, given that the foreign competitors already have, is smaller than the threshold value∆.
Thus, if foreign firms have merged, so will the domestic ones.
Result 2. (Domestic merger, given foreign merger.) If foreign companies have already
merged, so will the domestic firms. 
Nash merger equilibria
The relevant producer surpluses for the home firms, respectively the foreign firms, are summed up in Table 1 for the two situations of non-merger (N) and merger (M). In each cell, the upper line gives the producer surplus in the home country while the lower line describes producer surplus in the foreign country.
On the basis of Results 1 and 2 we can now conclude that the game between the group of home firms and the group of foreign firms have two possible merger equilibria. One equilibrium, the no-merger situation (N,N), is the outcome for cost reductions ∆ <∆, while the other, double-merger, equilibrium (M,M) emerges for ∆ >∆.
Why is it that the asymmetric situation of (M,N) or (N,M), where one group of firms merges and the other group does not, will not appear as a Nash-equilibrium? The answer is that for a group of firms it is more attractive to move from a three-firm situation in the world market to duopoly there than from a four-firm situation to the three-firm situation. In both cases, the loss of market share (absent any cost reduction)
is one sixth, but the increase in market concentration delivers a bigger push to the world market price, when the number of firms there goes from three to two as compared to from four to three. 
Optimal merger policy 4.1 Nationally optimal merger policy
In the last section we have determined the critical cost reduction∆ for which a merger increases producer surplus. In a similar way we now determine the critical cost reduction that is necessary to increase consumer surplus. Since firms in country H do not serve consumers in F and vice versa, the change in each country's consumer surplus from a domestic merger is independent of whether foreign firms have already merged or not.
For the home country we get
which is unambiguously negative at ∆ = 0 and monotonically rising in ∆. From this we can calculate the critical value, at which the change in consumer surplus induced by a domestic merger turns positive. This is
which is unambiguously above the threshold for which the merger is in the firms' private interest (recall that∆ < (a − 1)/20). In our model this characterizes the 'rather impressive synergies' (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, 114) that are needed for a merger to reduce consumer prices.
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By adding the producer and consumer surplus measures derived in the previous section, we can derive total surplus measures for the home and foreign country, respectively, and for each of the different merger scenarios. This is done in Table 2 .
We denote by ∆ * the critical cost reduction required to increase domestic welfare (i.e., the sum of producer and consumer surpluses) as a result of a merger. Using the results in Table 2 
Globally optimal merger policy
When deciding on a merger proposal, national governments in our model neglect two externalities that are caused by the domestic merger:
1. the effect on the producer surplus earned by foreign firms;
2. the effect on consumer surplus in the world market.
The size of both effects depends on whether foreign firms have already merged, or not.
To complete our analysis of the welfare effects of mergers, Table 3 summarizes the consumer surplus in the world market in each of the different merger scenarios.
Let us first consider the case where foreign firms have not merged. The change in foreign producer surplus caused by a domestic merger is inferred from Table 1 . The foreign firms benefit from the domestic merger if
The condition for consumers in the world market to benefit from the domestic merger is inferred from Table 3 . It is
Taken together, eqs. (17) and (18) To determine the net externality caused by the domestic merger, we have to add up Φ 1 in (17) and Φ 2 in (18). This yields
It is easily checked that ∆ = (a − 1)/5 is the only value that solves Φ = 0. Moreover, differentiating with respect to ∆ shows that
Since Φ(∆)) is strictly convex and is tangent to the vertical axis at (a−1)/5, it must be positive for all other values of ∆. Intuitively, this finding implies that for ∆ < (a−1)/5, the positive externality that a domestic merger causes for foreign producers exceeds the negative effect on world consumers. For ∆ > (a − 1)/5, the positive externality of a domestic merger on world consumers exceeds the negative effect on foreign producer surplus.
Adding up Λ in (16) and Φ in (19) gives a measure of global total surplus 11 defined by . This argument is illustrated in Figure 3 .
11 Foreign consumer surplus is not included in this welfare measure, because it is unaffected by the domestic merger. 
Optimal merger policy in a union of countries
Finally we consider the merger policy formulated by a union of countries, an obvious case in point being the European Union. Consider then a market that is dominated by EU producers, but these producers are located in different member countries of the EU. A typical example is the market for mobile phones where large producers exist in several EU member states, and the EU is a large net exporter to the world market. In our model a merger policy formulated at the EU level will then take into account the joint producer surplus of all firms, but it will not consider the welfare of consumers in third markets. We denote the relevant welfare measure of the region by Ψ ≡ Λ + Φ 1 .
From (16) and (17) we get
From this we can infer that the merger improves regional welfare even in the absence of any cost reduction, as long as R < 0.40. The reason is that if the world market is sufficiently large, then the welfare gain to the region from raising the price in the world market will dominate the efficiency loss from the merger in the home country. Even if this condition is not met, it is straightforward to establish that the critical level of cost reduction that will make the union accept the merger is always below the globally optimal threshold ∆ * * , as long as the latter is below (a − 1)/5. In this case, a domestic merger raises the price in the world market and thus causes a negative externality for world consumers.
Hence, in contrast to nationally optimal merger policy, a regional merger policy will generally be 'too permissive' towards merger proposals. This is summed up in 
International mergers
(This section is still to be written.)
A further issue that can naturally be addressed in our setting is an international merger, say between H's firm 1 and F's firm 1. By merging, the two experience a cost reduction, which strengthens their position in their domestic markets and -ignoring their loss of combined market share in the world market -also there. In the same way as in section 4 above, the optimal policies towards such international mergers will be analyzed from a national and a global perspective, as well as from the perspective of a union of countries.
(...)
Conclusions
In this paper we have asked the question whether it may be in the interest of national governments to create 'global players' by means of a permissive merger policy, even if the accompanying cost reductions are insufficient to compensate for the anticompetitive effects of the merger from a global efficiency perspective. At first sight, this policy seems to parallel strategic trade policy, where governments can increase total domestic surplus by giving output subsidies that increase the firm's market share in third countries (Brander and Spencer, 1985) .
It turns out in our model, however, that national merger policies will generally be 'too restrictive', rather than 'too permissive', when compared to those of a global planner. The primary reason for this result is that a domestic merger imparts a positive externality on foreign producers, as it increases their aggregate market share in the world market by reducing the number of domestic producers. In contrast, the merger policies of a union of countries that together comprise most producers, but only a share of consumers, can indeed be overly permissive, in the sense that the union's regulatory agency will accept mergers that reduce world welfare. This may be one possible explanation why merger control at the level of the European Union has been very lax: of almost 1600 merger proposals that the European Commission has dealt with, more than 85 per cent were accepted immediately and only 13 mergers, or less than 1 per cent, were finally rejected (Schmidt, 2002, p. 237) .
It has to be stressed, however, that the Cournot model of quantity competition between firms precludes the case where a firm that gains a cost reduction on account of a merger will sweep the whole market in which it operates. A model of Bertrand price competition will yield different results in regard to the cost reductions that are necessary for a merger to be attractive from a firm or a national perspective. However, it is less clear that for instance our finding that the national merger authority is likely to be too restrictive in its merger policy from a global standpoint will depend critically on the precise assumption about the nature of competition or homogeneity of goods. These issues should, though, be investigated in future work.
